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2003, 05, 81-83
高校后勤企业化会计监督管理弱化的博弈分析
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发布时间: 2003-10-30
出版时间: 2003-10-30
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摘要:

由于高校投资体制逐渐由单一的国家投资向多元化方向发展,在高校后勤企业化、市场化改革过程中,投资者对高校会计信息的需求质量要求越来越高。一旦高校会计监督管理不力,行为扭曲,就会表现为会计监督管理弱化,导致高校会计信息失真、会计工作秩序混乱、会计主体违背职业道德徇私舞弊等。

Abstract:

Because the investment system of higher learning develops from single national investment to multiple investment directions, the requirement of investors for accounting information quality becomes higher and higher in the process of changing logistics of higher learning into enterprises and market. Once accounting supervision management of higher learning is weakened, distorted behaviors will result in false accounting information of higher learning, disordered accounting work and malpractices. Accounting practices will run counter to the professionel morality.

基本信息:

中图分类号:F224

引用信息:

[1]冉启秀.高校后勤企业化会计监督管理弱化的博弈分析[J].重庆工商大学学报.西部经济论坛,2003(05):81-83.

发布时间:

2003-10-30

出版时间:

2003-10-30

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