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上市公司的信息披露违规行为阻碍了资本市场的健康平稳发展,以“金税三期”工程为代表的税收征管数字化升级则为治理信息披露违规提供了一条有效路径。将“金税三期”工程作为一项准自然实验,采用2007—2021年沪深A股上市公司数据,通过多时点双重差分模型检验税收征管数字化升级对上市公司信息披露违规行为的治理效应,结果发现:税收征管数字化升级显著抑制了上市公司信息披露违规的发生和次数,其中存在通过改善信息环境和优化公司治理抑制信息披露违规的双重传导路径;地区税收征管强度和行业竞争程度的提高会强化税收征管数字化升级对上市公司信息披露违规行为的抑制作用,内部控制质量的提高可以强化税收征管数字化升级对信息披露违规次数的抑制作用,而对信息披露违规发生则表现出两者具有替代关系。因此,政府部门应持续推进税收征管数字化升级,强化税收征管并采取差异化措施,企业则应不断提高内部控制质量,以充分发挥税收大数据的治理功效。
Abstract:“Sunlight is the best preservative, and light is the most effective police”. Information disclosure is the soul of the capital market and is an important embodiment of the effectiveness of corporate governance. However, in the real environment, the information disclosure violations driven by the interests of listed companies not only affect investor confidence, causing capital allocation errors, but also destroy the financial supervision order and hinder the healthy and stable development of the capital market. In the context of the digital economy era, the in-depth integration of digital technology with the tax collection and administration system has become an important governance tool of the digital government, which may play an important role in regulating and governing listed companies, and has become an important direction to be actively explored by the financial market regulators and tax collection and administration departments.Taking listed companies' information disclosure violations as a research perspective, this paper selects the third phase of the Golden Tax Project as a quasi-natural experiment scene to investigate the policy effects, action mechanisms, and differences in different scenarios of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration. Benchmark regression found that the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration had a significant inhibitory effect on listed companies' information disclosure violations, which has been verified by a series of robustness tests. The test of the mechanism of action shows that the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration mainly inhibits the violation of information disclosure of listed companies by optimizing corporate governance and improving the information environment. Expansion analysis shows that the governance effect of digital upgrading of tax collection and administration on disclosure of listed companies varies significantly depending on the intensity of regional tax administration, the degree of industry competition, and the quality of internal control.Compared with previous literature, this paper expands in the following two aspects: firstly, it explores the theoretical mechanism of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration affecting corporate disclosure violations, and enriches the research on the economic consequences of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration from the perspective of disclosure governance, unlike the existing studies focusing on the perspectives of daily operation, financing constraints, and social responsibility of enterprises; secondly, it provides a new perspective for the research on the information disclosure governance of listed companies. This paper uses the third phase of the Golden Tax Project as a policy impact and adopts the differential model to systematically test the impact of tax collection and administration under big data technology on the information disclosure behavior of listed companies. To a certain extent, the research in this paper reveals the internal logic of the digital upgrade of tax collection and administration to participate in the governance of listed companies, which helps to improve our understanding of the violations of information disclosure of listed companies, and helps government departments to serve the healthy development of the capital market in a more targeted manner under the initiative of “strengthening the construction of digital government and promoting the modernization of governance capacity”. It provides differentiated experience support for the information disclosure governance of listed companies under different scenarios, and better guides enterprises to strengthen their integrity construction and strictly comply with relevant accounting standards and information disclosure standards.
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基本信息:
中图分类号:F812.42;F49;F275.4;F832.51
引用信息:
[1]牛彪,王建新,于翔.税收征管数字化升级与上市公司信息披露违规——“金税三期”工程的治理效应检验[J].西部论坛,2023,33(04):47-60.
2023-09-14
2023-09-14
2023-09-14